Non-Empirical Confirmation
Dr. Richard Dawid (LMU- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich)

For the last thirty years, string theory has played a highly influential role in fundamental physics without having found empirical confirmation.
The presentation will analyse reasons for the high degree of trust many physicists have developed in a theory that, according to classical standards of theory assessment, would have to be called an unconfirmed speculation. It will be argued that the cases of string theory and some other theories in contemporary fundamental physics suggest an extension of the concept of theory confirmation that allows for confirmation by observations that are not predicted by the theory in question (to be called "non-empirical confirmation"). The relevance of non-empirical confirmation reaches far beyond the context of fundamental physics, however, and may throw new light on a number of core debates in the philosophy of science.
In the first, general part of the talk I will give a general introduction to the traditional understanding of theory confirmation.
The second, more specific part will then be devoted to specifying the new broader conception of theory confirmation that seems better suited to account for the situation contemporary fundamental physics finds itself in.